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THE ROUTE TO CHAOS IN ROUTING GAMES:
POPULATION INCREASE DRIVES PERIOD-DOUBLING INSTABILITY,
CHAOS & INEFFICIENCY WITH PRICE OF ANARCHY EQUAL TO ONE
THIPARAT CHOTIBUT, FRYDERYK FALNIOWSKI, MICHA L MISIUREWICZ,
AND GEORGIOS PILIOURAS
Abstract. We study a learning dynamic model of routing (congestion) games to explore
how an increase in the total demand influences system performance. We focus on non-atomic
routing games with two parallel edges of linear cost, where all agents evolve using Multi-
plicative Weights Updates with a fixed learning rate. Previous game-theoretic equilibrium
analysis suggests that system performance is close to optimal in the large population limit,
as seen by the Price of Anarchy reduction. In this work, however, we reveal a rather undesir-
able consequence of non-equilibrium phenomena driven by population increase. As the total
demand rises, we prove that the learning dynamics unavoidably become non-equilibrating,
typically chaotic. The Price of Anarchy predictions of near-optimal performance no longer
apply. To the contrary, the time-average social cost may converge to its worst possible value
in the large population limit.
Every system has a carrying capacity, above which the dynamics is non-equilibrating. If
the equilibrium flow is a symmetric 50− 50% split, the system exhibits one period-doubling
bifurcation. A single periodic attractor of period two replaces the attracting fixed point
when the demand exceeds the carrying capacity. In general, for asymmetric equilibrium
flows, increasing the demand destabilizes the system, so that the system eventually becomes
Li-Yorke chaotic with positive topological entropy. This demand-driven instability emerges
from any pair of linear cost functions. Remarkably, in any non-equilibrating regime, the
time-average flows on the edges converge exactly to the equilibrium flows, a property akin
to no-regret learning in zero-sum games. Our results extend to any sequence of shrinking
learning rates, e.g., 1/
√
T , by allowing for a dynamically increasing population size.
Figure 1. If the equilibrium flow is symmetric between the two routes (b = 0.5), large total
demand N leads to a limit cycle of period 2. In any game with an asymmetric equilibrium
split (b 6= 0.5), chaos emerges at large N . For detailed discussions, see Figure 2.
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1. Introduction
Congestion games [71] are amongst the most well studied class of games in game theory.
Being isomorphic to potential games [56], congestion games are one of the few classes of
games in which a variety of learning dynamics are known to converge to Nash equilibria
[9, 29, 32, 34, 44, 45]. Proving convergence to equilibria typically exploits the existence of
the potential function that acts as a (strong) Lyapunov function for learning dynamics; this
function is strictly decreasing when the system is out-of-equilibrium.
Congestion games also play a pivotal role in the study of Price of Anarchy [10, 21, 26, 35, 46,
73]. Price of Anarchy is defined as the ratio of the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium
to the social cost of the optimal state. A small Price of Anarchy implies that all Nash
equilibria are near optimal, and hence any equilibrating learning dynamics suffices to reach
approximately optimal system performance. One of the hallmarks of the Price of Anarchy
research has been the development of tight Price of Anarchy bounds for congestion games
that are independent of the topology of the network or the number of users. Specifically,
under the prototypical assumption of linear cost functions, Price of Anarchy in the case of
non-atomic agents (in which each agent controls an infinitesimal amount of flow) is at most
4/3 [73]. In the atomic case (in which each agent controls a discrete unit of flow), Price of
Anarchy is at most 5/2 [21], with small networks sufficing to provide tight lower bounds.
Additionally, congestion games have paved the way for recent developments in Price
of Anarchy research, extending our understanding of system performance even for non-
equilibrating dynamics. Roughgarden [72] showed that most Price of Anarchy results could
be organized in a common framework known as (λ, µ)-smoothness. For classes of games
that satisfy this property, such as congestion games, the Price of Anarchy bounds derived
for worst case Nash equilibria immediately carry over to worst case instantiations of re-
gret minimizing algorithms. An (online) algorithm is said to minimize regret as long as
its time-average performance is roughly as good as that of the best fixed action with hind-
sight. The most ubiquitous member of this class of algorithms is arguably the Multiplicative
Weights Update (MWU) [5]. The aforementioned Price of Anarchy results readily apply to
any learning dynamics or any sequence of strategic plays, as long as the algorithms achieve
small time-average regret. In the case of congestion games, near optimal performance is
guaranteed, at least asymptotically, even when learning does not equilibrate (see Section 8
for the discussion on slow convergence rates that reduce the applicability of such results in
many applications of interest, including congestion games with many agents).
All these positive results have inspired growing efforts to achieve stronger efficiency guar-
antees. How close to 1 can the Price of Anarchy get? For example, in linear congestion
games, what is the final correct answer after all? Is it 5/2 as the atomic model suggests, or is
the much better non-atomic bound of 4/3 binding? In the case of polynomial cost functions,
the gap between these predictions grows exponentially fast with the degree of the polyno-
mials, making this question even more pressing. In a recent development, [31] argues that
even if the agents are atomic, as long as the number of agents N is large, atomic congestion
games behave approximately as non-atomic ones; hence, 4/3 is the correct bound. That is,
the much smaller non-atomic bound is the correct one after all. A series of related results
has followed [22–24], suggesting strong bounds on Price of Anarchy under the assumption of
large demand. What is the connection between atomic and non-atomic congestion games?
Let us consider the simplest congestion game example. A game with two strategies and
two agents where the cost/latency of each strategy is equal to its load. The worst Nash
THE ROUTE TO CHAOS IN ROUTING GAMES 3
equilibrium of this game has both agents choosing a strategy uniformly at random. The
expected cost of each agent is 3/2, i.e., a cost equal to 1 due to their own load, and an
expected extra cost of 1/2 due to the 50% chance of adopting the same strategy as the other
agent. On the other hand, at the optimal state, each agent selects a distinct strategy at
a cost of 1. As a result, the Price of Anarchy for this game is 3/2. Suppose now that we
increase the number of agents from 2 to N1. The worst equilibrium still has each agent
choosing a strategy uniformly at random at an expected cost of (N − 1)/2 + 1 = (N + 1)/2.
The optimal configuration splits the agents, deterministically and equally to both strategies
at a cost of N/2 per agent. The Price of Anarchy is 1 + 1/N, converging to 1 as N grows.
Indeed, as the population size grows, the atomic game is more conveniently described by its
effective non-atomic counterpart, with a continuum of users, and a unique equilibrium that
equidistributes the total demand N between the two strategies. The Price of Anarchy result
suggests that traffic networks can surprisingly become more efficient as we overload them.
This sounds counterintuitively too good to be true. Have we been oversimplifying certain
assumptions?
In this work, we will show that the stronger Price of Anarchy bound can come at a
significant cost. That is, increasing the total demand can destabilize the system, leading to
an erratic, non-equilibrating behavior of arbitrarily high cost. Moreover, even if the agents
apply a regret minimizing algorithm, such as MWU with an arbitrarily small learning rate ,
increasing the total demand guarantees period-doubling bifurcations will arise and the social
cost will increase with non-equilibrium fluctuations from an equilibrium flow, rendering the
stronger non-atomic Price of Anarchy bound moot from a practical perspective.
To build an intuition of why instability can arise, let us revisit the simple example with two
strategies and let us consider a continuum of users N updating their strategies according to a
learning dynamic, e.g. MWU with a step-size . Given any non-equilibrium initial condition,
the agents on the over-congested strategy have a strong incentive to migrate to the other
strategy. As they all act in unison, if the total demand is sufficiently large, the corrective
deviation to the other strategy will be overly aggressive, resulting in the other strategy being
over-congested.
With this heuristic consideration, a self-sustaining non-equilibrating behavior, where users
bear higher time-average costs than those at the equilibrium flow, may seem reasonable. In
this work, we will show rigorously that even a simple network can indeed exhibit robust and
rich non-equilibrating dynamics, displaying periodic orbits or chaos with large time-average
social costs. Congestion games, despite near-fifty-year investigations, are still far from being
fully understood when learning dynamics are taken into account. As we will show, non-
equilibrating dynamics can arise even in classic regret-minizing dynamics with arbitrarily
small learning rates , which arguably encapsulate the learning behavior of rational self-
interested agents. Despite the usefulness of (λ, µ)-smoothness, there exist regimes of regret-
minimizing dynamics in games whose performance cannot be understood fully using standard
equilibrium frameworks. These limitations also apply for learning with decreasing step sizes
(e.g., 1/
√
T , as long as the population is slowly increasing). Thus, in congestion games with
large populations, the Price of Anarchy guarantees from the (λ, µ)-smoothness do not become
binding until after possibly very long chaotic histories of arbitrarily high time-average social
cost, see Section 8.
1For simplicity, let N be an even number.
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Our results: We study linear non-atomic congestion games with two edges and total
demand N . All agents are assumed to evolve their behavior using Multiplicative Weights
Updates with an arbitrarily small, fixed learning rate . In Section 3 we show that every
such system has a critical threshold, a hidden system capacity, which when exceeded, the
system exhibits a bifurcation and no longer converges to its equilibrium flow. If the unique
equilibrium flow is the 50−50% split (doubly symmetric game), the system proceeds through
exactly one period-doubling bifurcation, where a single attracting periodic orbit of period
two replaces the attracting fixed point. In the case where the game possesses an asymmetric
equilibrium flow, the bifurcation diagram is much more complex. As the total demand
changes, we will see the birth and death of periodic attractors of various periods. All such
systems provably exhibit Li-Yorke chaos, given sufficiently large total demand. This implies
that there exists an uncountable set of initial conditions such that the set is ”scrambled”,
i.e., given any two initial conditions x(0), y(0) in this set, lim inf dist(x(t), y(t)) = 0 while
lim sup dist(x(t), y(t)) > 0. Our analysis leverages techniques developed for two-agent two-
strategy congestion games [20, 61], see Section 7.
Everywhere in the non-equilibrating regime, MWU’s time-average behavior is reminiscent
of its behavior in zero-sum games. Namely, the time-average flows and costs of the strategies
converge exactly to their equilibrium values. Unlike zero-sum games, however, these non-
equilibrium dynamics exhibit large regret (Section 4), and (possibly arbitrarily) high time-
average social costs (Section 5), even when the Price of Anarchy is equal to one. In Section 6,
we argue that the system displays another signature of chaotic behavior, positive topological
entropy. We provide an intuitive explanation by showing that if we encode three events: A)
the system is approximately at equilibrium, B) the first strategy is overly congested, C) the
second strategy is overly congested, then the number of possible sequences on the alphabet
{A,B,C}, encapsulating possible system dynamics, grows exponentially with time. Clearly,
if the system reached an (approximate) equilibrium, any sequences must terminate with an
infinite string of the form . . .AAA. . . . Rather, we find that the system can become truly
unpredictable, in the sense that small differences in initial conditions lead to considerably
distinct sequences of events.
Akin to Drosophila in developmental biology or the hydrogen atom in physics, we believe
that two-strategy congestion games with MWU learning dynamics is a minimal yet insightful
model of game theory, that helps advance our understanding of the interplay between non-
equilibrium dynamics, regret, and Price of Anarchy. The paper ends with discussions and
observations that carry over to the Appendices. For instance, we show that, in certain
non-equilibrating regimes, the system may possess multiple distinct attractors and hence
the time-average regret and social cost depend critically on initial conditions. Properties of
periodic orbits, the evidence of Feigenbaum’s universal route to chaos in our non-unimodal
map, as well as extensions to more complex congestion games are also provided in the
Appendices.
2. Model
We consider a two-strategy congestion game (see [71]) with a continuum of players(agents),
where all of them apply the multiplicative weights update to update their strategies [5]. Each
of the players controls an infinitesimal small fraction of the flow. We will assume that the
total flow of all the players is equal to N . We will denote the fraction of the players adopting
the first strategy at time n as xn. The second strategy is then chosen by 1− xn fraction of
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Figure 2. These bifurcation diagrams summarize the non-equilibrium phenomena iden-
tified in this work. When Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) learning is applied on
a non-atomic linear congestion games with two routes, population increase drives period-
doubling instability and chaos. Standard equilibrium analysis only holds at small population
sizes, shown in light cyan regions. As population size N (up to a rescaling factor of a fixed
learning rate) increases, regret-minimizing MWU algorithm no longer converges to the Nash
equilibrium flow b, depicted as the green horizontal lines; the proportion of users using the
first route deviates significantly from the Nash equilibrium flow. When the equilibrium flow
is symmetric between the two routes (b = 0.5), large N leads to non-equilibrium dynamics
that is attracted toward a limit cycle of period two. For large N , the two periodic points can
approach 1 or 0 arbitrarily close, meaning that almost all users will occupy the same route,
while simultaneously alternating between the two routes. Thus, the time-average social cost
can become as bad as possible. In any game with an asymmetric equilibrium flow (b 6= 0.5),
Li-Yorke chaos is inevitable as N increases. Although the dynamics is non-equilibrating or
chaotic, the time-average of the orbits still converges exactly to the equilibrium b. This work
proves the aforementioned statements, and investigates the implications of non-equilibrium
dynamics on the standard Price of Anarchy analysis. Properties of chaotic attractors and
of the period-doubling bifurcations, as well as extensions to more complex congestion games
are studied in the appendices.
6 T. CHOTIBUT, F. FALNIOWSKI, M. MISIUREWICZ, AND G. PILIOURAS
the players. This model physically encapsulates how a large population of commuters selects
between the two alternative paths that connect the initial point to the end point. When
a large fraction of the players adopt the same strategy, congestion arises, and the cost of
choosing the same strategy increases.
Linear routing games: We focus on linear cost functions. Specifically, the cost of each
path (link, route, or strategy) here will be assumed proportional to the load. By denoting
c(j) the cost of selecting the strategy number j (when x fraction of the agents choose the
first strategy), if the coefficients of proportionality are α, β > 0, we obtain
(1) c(1) = αNx, c(2) = βN(1− x).
Our analysis on the emergence of bifurcations, limit cycles and chaos will carry over
immediately to the cost functions of the form αx + γ. As we will see, the only parameter
that is important is the value of the equilibrium split, i.e. the percentage of players using
the first strategy at equilibrium. The first advantage of this formulation is that the fraction
of agents using each strategy at equilibrium is independent of the flow N . The second
advantage is that the Price of Anarchy of these games is exactly 1, independent of α, β, and
N . Hence, the model offers the benchmark of Price of Anarchy equilibrium analysis, which
typically suggests optimal social cost at large demand N , and our goal is to elucidate how
the social cost arising from non-equilibrium learning dynamics can be far from optimal.
2.1. Learning in congestion games with multiplicative weights. At time n + 1, we
assume the players know the cost of the strategies at time n (equivalently, the probabilities
xn, 1− xn) and update their choices. Since we have a continuum of agents, the realized flow
(split) is accurately described by the probabilities (xn, 1− xn). The algorithm for updating
the probabilities that we focus on is the multiplicative weights update (MWU), the ubiquitous
learning algorithm widely employed in Machine Learning, optimization, and game theory [5].
Namely, there is a parameter  ∈ (0, 1), which can be treated as the common learning rate
of all players, such that each probability gets multiplied by (1 − ) to the power which is
the cost of playing a given strategy by the given player. The numbers obtained in this way
usually will not be probabilities, so we have to normalize them. Thus, we get
(2)
xn+1 =
xn(1− )c(1)
xn(1− )c(1) + (1− xn)(1− )c(2)
=
xn
xn + (1− xn)(1− )c(2)−c(1) .
In this way, a large cost at time n will decrease the probability of choosing the same strategy
at time n+ 1.
By substituting into (2) the values of the cost functions from (1) we get:
(3)
xn+1 =
xn(1− )αNxn
xn(1− )αNxn + (1− xn)(1− )βN(1−xn)
=
xn
xn + (1− xn)(1− )βN−(α+β)Nxn .
We introduce the new variables
(4) a = (α + β)N ln
(
1
1− 
)
, b =
β
α + β
.
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In fact, we can assume without loss of generality that α+β = 1 (i.e., by the transformation
α′ = α
α+β
, β′ = β
α+β
, and ′ = 1−(1−)α+β). Under these assumptions, equations (4) simplify
to
(5) a = N ln
(
1
1− 
)
, b = β.
We will thus study the dynamical systems generated by the one-dimensional map:
(6) fa,b(x) =
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b)) .
As commonly adopted as a standard assumption, the learning rate  can be regarded as
a small, fixed constant in the following analysis but the exact value of constant  is not
of particular interest as our analysis/results will hold for any fixed choice of  no matter
how small. Setting  = 1 − 1/e such that ln ( 1
1−
)
= 1 simplifies notation as under this
assumption a = N . We will then study the effects of the remaining two parameters on system
performance, i.e. a, the (normalized) system demand and b, the (normalized) equilibrium
flow. When b = 0.5 the routing game is fully symmetric; whereas, when b is close to 0 or 1,
the routing instance becomes close to a Pigou network with almost all agents selecting the
same edge at equilibrium.
2.2. Regret, Price of Anarchy and time average social cost. We will now consider
this game from the perspective of each agent as an instance of an online optimization prob-
lem. Consider the set A = {1, 2} of 2 actions and a time horizon T ≥ 1. At each time
step n = 1, 2, . . . , T : A decision maker picks a probability distribution xn = (xn, 1 − xn)
over her actions A. An adversary picks a cost vector cn : A → [−1, 1]. An action an is
chosen according to the distribution xn, and the decision-maker receives reward rn(an). The
decision-maker learns rn, the entire reward vector.
An online decision-making algorithm such as MWU specifies for each n the probabil-
ity distribution xn, as a function of the cost vectors c1, . . . , cn−1 and the realized actions
a1, . . . , an−1 of the first n− 1 time steps. An adversary for such an algorithm A specifies for
each n the cost vector cn, as a function of the probability distributions x1, . . . , xn used by
A on the first n days and the realized actions a1, . . . , an−1 of the first n − 1 days. For ex-
ample, elements of A could represent different investment strategies, different driving routes
between home and work, different wireless routers, etc.
Rather than typically comparing the expected reward of an algorithm to that of the best
action sequence in hindsight, we compare it to the reward incurred by the best fixed action in
hindsight. Namely, we change our benchmark from
∑T
n=1 mina∈A cn(a) to mina∈A
∑T
n=1 cn(a).
Regret: Fix cost vectors c1, . . . , cT . The (expected) regret of the (randomized) algorithm
A choosing actions according x1, . . . , xT is
(7)
T∑
n=1
Ean∼xncn(an)︸ ︷︷ ︸
our algorithm
−min
a∈A
T∑
n=1
cn(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
best fixed action
,
where Ean∼xncn(an) expresses the expected cost of the algorithm in time period n, when an
action an ∈ A is chosen according to the probability distribution xn.
8 T. CHOTIBUT, F. FALNIOWSKI, M. MISIUREWICZ, AND G. PILIOURAS
In the game theory context, the cost vector cn of the each player is incurred by playing the
(congestion) game with the other players. Formally, the cost vector for each agent at time
n is cn =
(
αNxn, βN(1 − xn)
)
. The expected accumulated cost (of any of the symmetric
infinitesimally small agents) in time periods 1, . . . , T is equal to
∑T
n=1
(
αNx2n+βN(1−xn)2
)
.
The expected regret of the algorithm is given by the formula
T∑
n=1
(
αNx2n + βN(1− xn)2
)−min
a∈A
T∑
n=1
cn(a),
or equivalently,
T∑
n=1
(
αNx2n + βN(1− xn)2
)−min{ T∑
n=1
αNxn,
T∑
n=1
βN(1− xn)
}
.
Price of Anarchy: The Price of Anarchy of a game is the ratio of the supremum of the
social cost over all Nash equilibria divided by the social cost of the optimal state, where
the social cost of a state is the sum of the costs of all agents. In our case, where the total
flow (demand, or population size) is N , and a fraction x of the population adopts the first
strategy, the social cost is SC(x) = αN2x2 + βN2(1− x)2.
In non-atomic congestion games, it is well known that all equilibria have the same social
cost. Moreover, for linear cost functions c1(x) = αx, c2(x) = βx it is straightforward to
see that the Price of Anarchy is equal to one, as the unique equilibrium flow2, β, also is the
unique minimizer of the social cost, which attains a value of N2αβ.
With above terminology in mind, we will study the time-average social cost given some
initial condition. Since the time average of social cost may not converge to a specific value,
research in algorithmic game theory typically focuses on the supremum over all initial con-
ditions over all convergent subsequences. If we only consider time sequences with vanishing
time-average regret, their time averages normalized by the social cost of the optimal state is
called the Price of Total Anarchy, and, for non-atomic congestion games, it is equal to the
Price of Anarchy, which is equal to 1 in our case, suggesting optimal system performance [14].
Since MWU is not run with a decreasing step-size, the time-average regret may not vanish
and a more careful analysis is needed. Lastly, taking a dynamical systems point of view,
we will also study typical dynamical trajectories, since simulations suffice to identify the
limits of time-averages of these trajectories, which occur for initial conditions with positive
Lebesgue measure.
As we will show, as the total demand increases, the system will bifurcate away from the
Nash equilibrium; and the time-average social cost will be strictly greater than its optimal
value (in fact it can be artibtrarily close to its worst possible value). The Price of Anarchy
result is no longer be predictive of the true system’s non-equilibrium behavior. We now
state the formula that will be used later. Under the assumption α + β = 1, we define the
normalized time-average social cost as follows:
(8)
Time-average social cost
Optimum social cost
=
1
T
∑T
n=1
(
αN2x2n + βN
2(1− xn)2
)
N2αβ
=
1
T
∑T
n=1
(
x2n − 2βxn + β
)
β(1− β) .
2This statement is true under the normalization assumption α+ β = 1.
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3. Limit cycles and chaos, with time-average convergence to Nash
equilibrium
This section discusses the behavior of the one-dimensional map defined by (6), and its
remarkable time-average properties, which we will later employ to analyze the time-average
regret and the normalized time-average social cost in Sections 4 and 5. The map generated
by non-atomic congestion games here reduces to the map studied in [20], in which two-agent
linear congestion games are studied. Up to redefinition of the parameters as well as with
the symmetric initial conditions, i.e., on the diagonal, the one-dimensional map in the two
scenarios are identical. Thus in this section, we restate some key properties of the map. For
the proofs we refer the reader to [20].
We will start by investigating the dynamics under the map (6) given by
(9) fa,b(x) =
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b)) ,
with a > 0, b ∈ (0, 1). This map is generally asymmetric, unless b = 1/2, see the middle
column of Figure 3. It has three fixed points: 0, b and 1. The derivatives at the three fixed
points are
f ′a,b(0) = exp(ab), f
′
a,b(1) = exp(a(1− b)), f ′a,b(b) = ab2 − ab+ 1.
Hence, the fixed points 0 and 1 are repelling, while b is repelling whenever a > 2
b(1−b) .
The critical points of fa,b are solutions to ax
2 − ax+ 1 = 0. Thus, if 0 < a ≤ 4, then fa,b
is strictly increasing. If a > 4, it has two critical points
(10) xl =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− 4
a
)
, xr = 1− xl = 1
2
(
1 +
√
1− 4
a
)
so fa,b is bimodal.
Let us investigate regularity of fa,b. It is clear that it is analytic. However, nice properties
of interval maps are guaranteed not by analyticity, but by the negative Schwarzian derivative.
Let us recall that the Schwarzian derivative of f is given by the formula
Sf =
f ′′′
f ′
− 3
2
(
f ′′
f ′
)2
.
A “metatheorem” states that almost all natural noninvertible interval maps have negative
Schwarzian derivative. Note that if a ≤ 4 then fa,b is a homeomorphism, so we should not
expect negative Schwarzian derivative for that case.
Proposition 3.1. If a > 4 then the map fa,b has negative Schwarzian derivative.
For maps with negative Schwarzian derivative each attracting or neutral periodic orbit
has a critical point in its immediate basin of attraction. Thus, we know that if a > 4 then
fa,b can have at most two attracting or neutral periodic orbits.
3.1. Time-average convergence to Nash equilibrium b. While we know that the fixed
point b is often repelling, especially for large values of a, we can show that it is attracting in
a time-average sense.
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Figure 3. Population increase drives period-doubling instability and chaos. Al-
though our congestion game has an associated convex potential function Φa,b(x) =
N2
2
(αx2 + β(1− x)2) = a2
2
((1− b)x2 + b(1− x)2) whose unique global minimum is the Nash
equilibrium b (without loss of generality, we set α + β = 1 and  = 1 − 1/e so that a = N
and b = β), MWU at large a, or equivalently large N with a fixed , do not converge to
the equilibrium, unlike a gradient-like update with a small step size. A line with an arrow
connecting Φa,b(xn) to Φa,b(xn+1) = Φa,b(fa,b(xn)) in the left column is encoded with the color
representing the timestep n. Later times are shown in red, while earlier times are shown in
blue. Cobweb diagrams of the map fa,b are shown in the middle column, while the dynamics
of the map are shown on the right column. From top to bottom, values of a increase while
b remains fixed at 0.7, demonstrating population size-driven instability. At these parameter
values, the map fa,b is bimodal (blue curves in the middle column). For small a (top row),
the dynamics converge to the Nash equilibrium b. As a increases, the dynamics converge to
a period 2 attractor (second row), a period 4 attractor (third row), and a chaotic attractor
(bottom row). As shown in Section 3, however, the time average of these orbits is exactly the
Nash equilibrium b, represented by the horizontal green dashed lines on the right column.
The initial condition here is set to x0 = 0.2. The bifurcation diagram associated with b = 0.7
is shown in Fig. 4.
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Definition 3.2. For an interval map f a point p is Cesa`ro attracting if there is a set U
such that for every x ∈ U the averages
1
T
T−1∑
n=0
fn(x)
converge to p.
We can show that b is globally Cesa`ro attracting. Here by “globally” we mean that the
set U from the definition is the interval (0, 1).
Theorem 3.3. For every a > 0, b ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ (0, 1) we have
(11) lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
n=0
fna,b(x) = b.
Corollary 3.4. For every periodic orbit {x0, x1, . . . , xT−1} of fa,b in (0, 1) its center of mass
(time average)
x0 + x1 + · · ·+ xT−1
T
is equal to b.
Applying the Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem (see Section 6), we get a stronger corollary.
Corollary 3.5. For every probability measure µ, invariant for fa,b and such that µ({0, 1}) =
0, we have ∫
[0,1]
x dµ = b.
These statements show that the time average of the orbits generated by fa,b converges
exactly to the Nash equilibrium b. Next, we discuss what happens as we fix b and increase
the total demand by letting a grow large.
3.2. Periodic orbits and chaotic behavior. When b = 0.5, the coefficients of the cost
functions are identical, i.e., α = β.
Theorem 3.6. If 0 < a ≤ 8 then fa,0.5-trajectories of all points of (0, 1) converge to the fixed
point 0.5. If a > 8 then fa,0.5 has a periodic attracting orbit {σa, 1−σa}, where 0 < σa < 0.5.
This orbit attracts trajectories of all points of (0, 1), except countably many points, whose
trajectories eventually fall into the repelling fixed point 0.5.
Now we proceed with the case when b 6= 0.5, that is, when the cost functions differ. As we
noticed previously in Section 3, if a ≤ 4 then fa,b is strictly increasing and has three fixed
points: 0 and 1 repelling and b attracting. Therefore in this case trajectories of all points
of (0, 1) converge in a monotone way to b. We know that the fixed point b is repelling if
and only if a > 2
b(1−b) . This is a simple situation, so we turn to the case of large a. We fix
b ∈ (0, 1) \ {0.5} and let a go to infinity. We will show that if a becomes sufficiently large
(but how large, depends on b), then fa,b is Li-Yorke chaotic and has periodic orbits of all
possible periods.
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Definition 3.7 (Li-Yorke chaos). Let (X, f) be a dynamical system and (x, y) ∈ X × X.
We say that (x, y) is a Li-Yorke pair if
lim inf
n→∞
dist(fn(x), fn(y)) = 0,
lim sup
n→∞
dist(fn(x), fn(y)) > 0.
A dynamical system (X, f) is Li-Yorke chaotic if there is an uncountable set S ⊂ X (called
scrambled set) such that every pair (x, y) with x, y ∈ S and x 6= y is a Li-Yorke pair.3
The crucial ingredient of this analysis is the existence of periodic orbit of period 3.
Theorem 3.8. If b ∈ (0, 1) \ {0.5}, then there exists ab such that if a > ab then fa,b has
periodic orbit of period 3.
By the Sharkovsky Theorem ([79], see also [50]), existence of a periodic orbit of period 3
implies existence of periodic orbits of all periods, and by the result of [50], it implies that
the map is Li-Yorke chaotic. Thus, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 3.9. If b ∈ (0, 1) \ {0.5}, then there exists ab such that if a > ab then fa,b has
periodic orbits of all periods and is Li-Yorke chaotic.
This result has a remarkable implication in non-atomic routing games. Recall that the
parameter a expresses the normalized total flow/demand; thus, Corollary 3.9 implies that
when the game is asymmetric, i.e. when an interior equilibrium flow is not the 50% − 50%
split, increasing the total demand of the system will inevitably lead to chaotic behavior,
regardless of the form of the cost functions.4 In other words, the emergence of chaos at
sufficiently large demands is a robust phenomenon.
4. Analysis of time-average regret
In the previous section, we discussed the time average convergence to Nash equilibrium
for the map fa,b. We now employ this property to investigate the time-average regret from
learning with MWU.
Theorem 4.1. The limit of the time-average regret is the total demand N times the limit
of the observable (x− b)2 (provided this limit exists). That is
(12) lim
T→∞
RT
T
= N
(
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
n=1
(xn − b)2
)
.
Proof. Recall that the time-average regret is
(13)
1
T
RT =
1
T
T∑
n=1
(
αNx2n + βN(1− xn)2
)−min{ 1
T
T∑
n=1
αNxn,
1
T
T∑
n=1
βN(1− xn)
}
Consider
(14)
1
T
(
T∑
n=1
αxn −
T∑
n=1
β(1− xn)
)
=
1
T
T∑
n=1
[(α + β)xn − β] = (α + β)
(
1
T
T∑
n=1
xn − β
α + β
)
.
3Intuition behind this definition as well as other properties of chaotic behavior of dynamical systems are
discussed in Section 6.
4In fact we can strengthen this result, see Section 6.
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The quantity β
α+β
is the system equilibrium b. Without loss of generality we assume as
mentioned earlier α + β = 1. Then, b = β and limT→∞
(
1
T
∑T
n=1 xn
)
= b, by Theorem 3.3.
Therefore, in the limit T → ∞, two terms in min-term of (13) coincide and we have by
substituting α = 1− β and remembering that β = b
lim
T→∞
RT
T
= lim
T→∞
N
T
T∑
n=1
(
(1− β)x2n + β(1− xn)2 − β(1− β)
)
= lim
T→∞
N
T
T∑
n=1
(
x2n − 2βxn + β2
)
= lim
T→∞
N
T
T∑
n=1
(xn − b)2.

Observe that if x is a generic point of an ergodic invariant probability measure µ, then
the time limit of the observable (x− b)2 is equal to its space average ∫ 1
0
(x− b)2 dµ(x). This
quantity is the variance of the random variable identity (we will denote this variable X, so
X(x) = x) with respect to µ. Typical cases of such a measure µ, for which the set of generic
points has positive Lebesgue measure, are when there exists an attracting periodic orbit P
and µ is the measure equidistributed on P , and when µ is an ergodic invariant probability
measure absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure [28]. In analogue to
the family of quadratic interval maps [51], we have reasons to expect that for the Lebesgue
almost every pair of parameters (a, b) Lebesgue almost every point x ∈ (0, 1) is generic for a
measure of one of those two types.
Upper bound for time-average regret: Let a > 4 and b ∈ (0, 1). Recall from (10) that
fa,b has two critical points xl =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− 4
a
)
and xr = 1− xl = 12
(
1 +
√
1− 4
a
)
.
Let
ymin = fa,b(xr), ymax = fa,b(xl).
Lemma 4.2. For a > 1
b(1−b) the interval I = [ymin, ymax] is invariant and globally absorbing
on (0, 1).
Proof. Fix b ∈ (0, 1). Simple calculations show that b ∈ (xl, xr) if and only if a > 1/b(1−b).5
From now we assume that a > 1/b(1 − b). Recall that b is a fixed point of fa,b so we have
b = fa,b(b) ∈ fa,b([xl, xr]) = [ymin, ymax] = I. Therefore b ∈ I ∩ (xl, xr) and I ∩ (xl, xr) 6= ∅.
Because fa,b is decreasing between the critical points, we have f
′
a,b(b) = ab
2 − ab + 1 < 0.
The latter and the uniqueness of a fixed point in (0, 1) implies that fa,b(x) > x for x ∈ (0, b),
and fa,b(x) < x for x ∈ (b, 1).
Obviously, if x ∈ I ∩ (xl, xr), then fa,b(x) ∈ fa,b([xl, xr]) = I. For x ∈ [ymin, xl) we have
fa,b(x) < fa,b(xl) = ymax. Suppose that fa,b(x) < ymin, then fa,b(x) < ymin ≤ x but it is
impossible because fa,b(x) > x for x ∈ (0, b). Thus fa,b([ymin, xl]) ⊂ I. The same reasoning
shows that fa,b([xr, ymax]) ⊂ I. Thus fa,b(I) ⊂ I.
Now let x ∈ (0, xl). Obviously fa,b(x) < ymax and because xl < b we have fa,b(x) > x for
x < xl. To show that the orbit of x falls eventually into I, it is sufficient to show that there
exists n such that fna,b(x) > ymin. Suppose that there is no such n, that is f
n
a,b(x) < ymin for
all n. The sequence (fna,b(x))n≥1 is increasing and bounded, so it has a limit. Denote the
5Therefore b ∈ (xl, xr) when x = b is repelling (for a > 2/b(1− b)).
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limit by c ∈ (0, xl). Then fa,b(c) has to be equal c, but this contradicts the fact that on (0, xl)
there is no fixed point of fa,b. Thus, orbits of every point from (0, xl) will eventually fall into
the invariant set I. Similar reasoning will show that orbits of every point from x ∈ (xr, 1)
will eventually fall into I.

Lemma 4.2 implies the following bound for the variance.
Remark 4.3. For a > 1
b(1−b) the variance of X is bounded above by
Var(X) = lim
T→∞
(
1
T
T∑
n=1
(xn − b)2
)
≤ (ymax − b)(b− ymin).
To see how time-average regret changes as one increases the total demand N , we let as
usual  = 1− 1/e, so that a = N ln ( 1
1−
)
= N .
Theorem 4.4. For N > 1
b(1−b) the time-average regret is bounded above by
(15) lim
T→∞
RT
T
= N
(
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
n=1
(xn − b)2
)
≤ N(ymax − b)(b− ymin).
5. Analysis of time-average social cost
We begin this section with an extreme scenario of the time-average social cost; for a
symmetric equilibrium flow (b = 0.5), the time-average social cost can be arbitrarily close to
its worst possible value! In contrast to the optimal social cost attained at the equilibrium
b = 0.5, the long-time dynamics alternate between the two periodic points of the limit
cycle of period two, which, at large population size, can approach 1 or 0 arbitrarily closely,
see Figure 2 (top) or Figure 5. This means almost all users will occupy the same route,
while simultaneously alternating between the two routes. The time-average social cost thus
becomes worse at larger population sizes, approaching its worst possible value in the limit
of infinite population.
Theorem 5.1. For b = 0.5, the time-average social cost can be arbitrarily close to its worst
possible value for a sufficiently large a, i.e. for a sufficiently large population size6. Formally,
for any δ > 0, there exists an a such that, for any initial condition x0, except countably many
points, whose trajectories eventually fall into the fixed point b we have
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
n=1
SC(xn) > max
x
SC(x)− δ
Proof. For a symmetric equilibrium b = 0.5, the two cost functions increase with the loads
at the same rate α = β. Recall from Section 2.2 that the social cost when fraction x of
the population adopts the first strategy is SC(x) = αN2x2 + αN2(1 − x)2. This strictly
convex function attains its minimum at the equilibrium x = b = 0.5, and its maximum of
αN2 at x = 0 or x = 1. By Theorem 3.6 we know that for a > 8 there exists a periodic
attracting orbit {σa, 1−σa}, where 0 < σa < 0.5. This orbit attracts trajectories of all points
of (0, 1), except countably many points, whose trajectories eventually fall into the repelling
6Recall from (5) that a = N ln
(
1
1−
)
.
THE ROUTE TO CHAOS IN ROUTING GAMES 15
Figure 4. Bifurcation diagram (Top) demonstrates instability of the routing game driven
by the increase in total demand N. The Nash equilibrium here is set to b = 0.7. As usual,
we fix the learning rate  = 1− 1/e so that a = N for simplicity. At small N , the dynamics
converges toward the fixed point b, which is the Nash equilibrium. However, as N exceeds
the carrying capacity of N∗b = 2/b(1 − b), the Nash equilibrium becomes repelling and the
dynamics no longer converge to it. The period-doubling route to chaos begins. Remarkably,
the time-average of all orbits is exactly b, as is evident from the green line that tracks the
center of masses of the blue orbits. (Middle) The time-average regret 1
T
RT is shown in purple.
It suddenly becomes strictly positive at the first bifurcation, consistent with the prediction
of (12) which states that the time-average regret is proportional to the fluctuations from
the Nash equilibrium. The green line shows our upper bound on the time-average regret
from Equation (15). (Bottom) The normalized time-average social cost (i.e., time average
social cost divided by optimum) also suddenly becomes greater than 1 at the first bifurcation,
consistent with the prediction of Equation (8). Hence, the Price of Anarchy bound (of 1)
is only a valid upper bound for the system inefficiency before the first bifurcation arises.
The time average cost of the non-equilibrating dynamics is proportional to its fluctuations
away from the Nash equilibrium. The rate at which the normalized time-average social cost
increases above unity at the first bifurcation is depicted by the tangent line (dashed blue),
which is calculated from Equation (18).
fixed point 0.5. To establish that for all trajectories attracted by the orbit {σa, 1− σa} the
time-average limit of the social cost can become arbitrarily close to αN2, it suffices to show
that the distance of the two periodic points (of the unique attracting period-2 limit cycle)
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to the nearest boundary goes to zero as a → ∞. Thus, it suffices to show that given any
δ > 0, there exist an a such that σa < δ.
For brevity, we denote the map fa,0.5 by fa. Then, since σa is a periodic point of a limit
cycle of period 2, we have f 2a (σa) = σa. The last equality implies fa(σa) = 1 − σa, which,
after simple calculations, implies(
σa
1− σa
)2
= exp[a(σa − 0.5)].
Consider the function φ(x) =
(
x
1−x
)2− exp[a(x− 0.5)], then φ(0) = − exp[−0.5a] < 0. On
the other hand, for any δ ∈ (0, 0.5), φ(δ) = ( δ
1−δ
)2 − exp[a(δ − 0.5)] > 1
2
(
δ
1−δ
)2
> 0 for a
sufficiently large a > 0. The intermediate value theorem implies σa ∈ (0, δ), and the theorem
follows. 
More generally, when the equilibrium flow is asymmetric (b 6= 0.5), we can relate the
normalized time-average social cost to the non-equilibrium fluctuations from the equilibrium
flow. From (8), we obtain
(16) normalized time-average social cost =
1
T
∑T
n=1
(
x2n − 2βxn + β
)
β(1− β) = 1 +
Var(X)
β(1− β) .
If the dynamics converges to the fixed point b, the variance vanishes and the normalized
time-average social cost coincides with the Price of Anarchy which is 1. However, as the
total demand N increases, the system suddenly bifurcates at N = N∗b ≡ 2/b(1 − b), which
is the carrying capacity of the network. Above the carrying capacity N∗b , the system is non-
equilibrating, and the variance becomes positive. As a result, the normalized time-average
social cost becomes greater than 1. The Price of Anarchy prediction error, i.e., (normalized
time-average social cost)-(Price of Anarchy)> 0, depends on how fast the variance suddenly
increases at the first bifurcation point, which we analyze next.
5.1. Analysis of variance spreading at the first period-doubling bifurcation. We
study the behavior of the variance as a crosses the period doubling bifurcation point. We
first consider the model situation, where the map is g(x) = (γ1 − 1)x + γ2x2 + γ3x3. Note
that γ1 and γ2 here are not the coefficients of the cost functions. In this model situation,
the bifurcation occurs at γ1 = 0. If γ1 > 0 then the fixed point x = 0 is attracting, and as
γ1 < 0 then it is repelling, but under some conditions on the coefficients there is an attracting
periodic orbit of period 2. We are interested only at the limit behavior as γ1 goes to zero, in
a small neighborhood of x = 0. Therefore we may ignore all powers of x larger than 3 and
all powers of γ1 larger than 1. Period 2 points are non-zero solutions of the equation
x = (γ1−1)[(γ1−1)x+γ2x2 +γ3x3]+γ2[(γ1−1)x+γ2x2 +γ3x3]2 +γ3[(γ1−1)x+γ2x2 +γ3x3]3.
Ignoring higher order terms and dividing by x, we get the equation
(2γ22γ1 − 2γ22 + 4γ1γ3 − 2γ3)x2 − γ1γ2x− 2γ1 = 0.
Its discriminant is (after ignoring higher order terms in γ1)
∆ = −16γ1(γ22 + γ3),
so
x =
γ1γ2 ± 4
√−γ1(γ22 + γ3)
4(γ22γ1 − γ22 + 2γ1γ3 − γ3)
.
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Assume now that γ22 + γ3 > 0. This is equivalent to Sg(0) < 0, so we will be able to apply
it to our map (see Proposition 3.1). If γ1 is close to zero, in the numerator γ1 is negligible
compared to
√
γ1, and in the denominator γ1 is negligible compared to a constant. Thus,
approximately we have
x = ±
√ −γ1
γ22 + γ3
.
Therefore, the variance is Var(X) = −γ1
γ22+γ3
.
After Taylor expanding the map of Equation (6) around the fixed point b and comparing
the cofficients to those of g, we obtain γ1 = 2 + ab(b − 1), γ2 = a(b − 12)(1 + ab(b − 1))
and γ3 = a(1 + a(
1
6
+ b(b − 1))(3 + ab(b − 1))). Recalling the first bifurcation occurs at
a∗b = 2/b(1 − b), we thus deduce the (right) derivative of the variance with respect to a at
the first period-doubling bifurcation:
(17)
dVar(X)
da
∣∣∣
a=a∗+b
= −
d
(
γ1
γ22+γ3
)
da
∣∣∣
a=a∗+b
=
3b3(1− b)3
2− 6b(1− b) ,
which is a unimodal function in the interval [0, 1] that is symmetric around b = 0.5, at which
the maximum 0.09375 is attained.
This allows us to deduce how fast the normalized time-average social cost increases at the
first bifurcation, signaling how equilibrium Price of Anarchy metric fails as we increase a,
or equivalently increase N . Namely, from Equation (8), one finds that the derivative of the
normalized time-average social cost with respect to a reads
(18)
d
da
(normalized time-average social cost)
∣∣∣
a=a∗+b
=
1
b(1− b)
dVar(X)
da
∣∣∣
a=a∗+b
=
3b2(1− b)2
2− 6b(1− b) .
When a < 2/b(1− b), the system equilibrates and the normalized time-average social cost is
unity. However, when a exceeds 2/b(1− b), the system is out of equilibrium, and normalized
time-average social cost suddenly increases with a finite rate, given by Equation (18). At
the first period-doubling bifurcation, the second-derivative with respect to a becomes dis-
continuous, akin to the second order phase transition phenomena in statistical physics. Fig.
4 confirms the prediction of Equation (18).
Likewise, as the variance becomes positive, the time-average regret also becomes non-
zero. At the first period-doubling bifurcation, the time-average regret given by Equation
(12) suddenly increases with a at the rate (where we use our typical normalization a = N)
(19)
d
da
(time-average regret)
∣∣∣
a=a∗+b
=
d (aVar(X))
da
∣∣∣
a=a∗+b
=
3b2(1− b)2
1− 3b(1− b) .
Therefore, at the first period-doubling bifurcation, where the equilibrium analysis begins to
breakdown, the following equality holds
(20)
d
da
(time-average regret)
∣∣∣
a=a∗+b
= 2
d
da
(normalized time-average social cost)
∣∣∣
a=a∗+b
.
6. Chaos and Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem
This section familiarizes the reader with key concepts from dynamical systems necessary
for this work, e.g., chaotic behavior, absolutely continuous invariant measures, topological
entropy, and ergodic theorem.
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It seems that there is no universally accepted definition of chaotic behavior of a dynamical
system. Most definitions of chaos concern one of the following aspects:
• complex behavior of trajectories, such as Li-Yorke chaos;
• fast growth of the number of distinguishable orbits of length n, such as having positive
topological entropy;
• existence of absolutely continuous invariant measures;
• sensitive dependence on initial conditions, such as Devaney or Auslander-Yorke chaos;
• recurrence properties, such as transitivity or mixing.
In this article, the first three are crucial. Also, in the presence of chaos, studying precise
single orbit dynamics can be intractable; we study the average behavior of trajectories in-
stead. Thus, it is important to know whether the average converges. This is when ergodic
theorems come into play.
6.1. Li-Yorke chaos and topological entropy. The origin of the definition of Li-Yorke
chaos (see Definition 3.7) is in the seminal Li and Yorke’s article [50]. Intuitively orbits of
two points from the scrambled set have to gather themselves arbitrarily close and spring
aside infinitely many times but (if X is compact) it cannot happen simultaneously for each
pair of points. Why should a system with this property be chaotic? Obviously existence
of the scrambled set implies that orbits of points behave in unpredictable, complex way.
More arguments come from the theory of interval transformations, in view of which it was
introduced. For such maps the existence of one Li-Yorke pair implies the existence of an
uncountable scrambled set [47] and it is not very far from implying all other properties that
have been called chaotic in this context, see e.g. [74]. In general, Li-Yorke chaos has been
proved to be a necessary condition for many other ’chaotic’ properties to hold. A nice survey
of properties of Li-Yorke chaotic systems can be found in [13].
A crucial feature of the chaotic behavior of a dynamical system is exponential growth of
the number of distinguishable orbits. This happens if and only if the topological entropy of
the system is positive. In fact positivity of topological entropy turned out to be an essential
criterion of chaos [39]. This choice comes from the fact that the future of a deterministic
(zero entropy) dynamical system can be predicted if its past is known (see [88, Chapter 7])
and positive entropy is related to randomness and chaos.
For every dynamical system over a compact phase space, we can define a number h(f) ∈
[0,∞] called the topological entropy of transformation f . This quantity was first introduced
by Adler, Konheim and McAndrew [1] as the topological counterpart of metric (and Shannon)
entropy.
For a given positive integer n we define the n-th Bowen-Dinaburg metric on X, ρfn as
ρfn(x, y) = max
0≤i<n
dist(f i(x), f i(y)).
We say that the set E is (n, ε)-separated if ρfn(x, y) > ε for any distinct x, y ∈ E and by
s(n, ε, f) we denote the cardinality of the most numerous (n, ε)-separated set for (X, f).
Definition 6.1. The topological entropy of f is defined as
h(f) = lim
ε↘0
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log s(n, ε, f).
We begin with the intuitive explanation of the idea. Let us assume that we observe the
dynamical system with the precision ε > 0, that is, we can distinguish any two points,
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only if they are apart by at least ε. Then, we are able to see only as many points as is
the cardinality of the biggest (1, ε)-separated set. Therefore, after n iterations we will see
at most s(n, ε, f) different orbits. If transformation f is mixing points, then s(n, ε, f) will
grow. Taking upper limit over n will give us the exponential ratio of asymptotic growth of
number of (distinguishable) orbits, and going with ε to zero will give us the quantity which
can be treated as a measure of exponential speed, with which the number of orbits grow
(with n).
Both positive topological entropy and Li-Yorke chaos are local properties; in fact, entropy
depends only on a specific subset of the phase space and is concentrated on the set of so-
called nonwandering points [15]. The question whether positive topological entropy implies
Li-Yorke chaos remained open for some time, but eventually it was shown to be true; see [12].
On the other hand, there are Li-Yorke chaotic interval maps with zero topological entropy
(as was shown independently by Smı´tal [80] and Xiong [89]). For deeper discussion of these
matters we refer the reader to the excellent surveys by Blanchard [11], Glasner and Ye [40],
Li and Ye [49] and Ruette’s book [74].
Entropy of fa,b is positive: After this discussion we can show how entropy behaves for
fa,b. For any interval map, we have the following:
Theorem 6.2 ([54]). For an interval map f , the following assertions are equivalent:
i) f has a periodic point whose period is not a power of 2,
ii) the topological entropy of f is positive.
Thus, Theorem 6.2 combined with Corollary 3.9 strenghten the latter.
Corollary 6.3. If b ∈ (0, 1) \ {1/2}, then there exists ab such that if a > ab then fa,b has
periodic orbits of all periods, positive topological entropy and is Li-Yorke chaotic.
Calculating entropy: In general, computing the entropy is not an easy task. However,
in the context of interval maps, topological entropy can be computed quite straightforwardly
— it is equal to the exponential growth rate of the minimal number of monotone subintervals
for fn.
Theorem 6.4 ([55]). Let f be a piecewise monotone interval map and, for all n ≥ 1, let cn
be the minimal cardinality of a monotone partition for fn. Then
h(f) = lim
n→∞
1
n
log cn = inf
n≥1
1
n
log cn.
Moreover, for piecewise monotone interval maps, the entropy computed with any partition
into intervals, on which the map is monotone, is the topological entropy [2, Prop. 4.2.3].
This gives us a way to understand what positive entropy of fa,b means from a game-theoretic
perspective. For a > 1
b(1−b) the map fa,b is a bimodal map with two critical points xl, xr
(defined in (10)) and a (unique in (0, 1)) equilibrium b ∈ (xl, xr). Because x is the probability
of choosing the first strategy, we can say that if x < xl or x > xr, then one of the strategies is
overused and if x is close to b, x ∈ [xl, xr], then the system is approximately at equilibrium.
Now, we can take a partition {[0, xl), [xl, xr], (xr, 1]} into three intervals on which fa,b is
monotone. For every x ∈ [0, 1] and for every n ≥ 1 we encode three events for the n-th
iteration of x: x[n] = A if the system is approximately at equilibrium, that is if fna,b(x) ∈
[xl, xr]; x[n] = B if the second strategy is overused, that is when f
n
a,b(x) ∈ [0, xl) and x[n] = C
if the first strategy is overused, fna,b(x) ∈ (xr, 1]. This way for every x ∈ [0, 1] we get an
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infinite sequence x on the alphabet {A,B,C}. Now, the fact that h(fa,b) > 0 implies that
the number of different blocks of length n, which we can observe looking at different x we
generated this way, will grow exponentially.
6.2. Invariant measures and ergodic theorem. We can also discuss a discrete dynami-
cal system in terms of a measure preserving transformation defined on the probability space.
This approach can handle not only purely mathematical concepts but also physical phe-
nomena in nature. This subsection is devoted to invariant measures, absolutely continuous
measures and the most fundamental idea in ergodic theory — the Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem,
which states that with probability one the average of a function along an orbit of an ergodic
transformation is equal to the integral of the given function.
Definitions. Let (X,B, µ) be a probability space and f : X 7→ X be a measurable map.
The measure µ is f -invariant (a map f is µ-invariant) if µ(f−1E) = µ(E) for every E ∈ B.
For f -invariant measure µ we say that µ is ergodic (f is ergodic) if E ∈ B satisfies f−1E = E
if and only if µ(E) = 0 or 1. A measure µ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure if and only if for every set E ∈ B of zero Lebesgue measure µ(E) = 0.
We can now state ergodic theorem.
Theorem 6.5 (Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem). Let (X,B, µ) be a probability space. If f is
µ-invariant and g is integrable, then
lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
g(fk(x)) = g∗(x)
for some g∗ ∈ L1(X,µ) with g∗(f(x)) = g∗(x) for almost every x. Furthermore if f is
ergodic, then g∗ is constant and
lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
g(fk(x)) =
∫
X
g dµ
for almost every x.
Lastly, why absolutely continuous invariant measures matter? Computer-based investiga-
tions are widely used to gain insights into the dynamics of chaotic phenomena. However,
one must exercise caution in the interpretation of computer simulations. Often, chaotic sys-
tems exhibit multiple ergodic invariant measures [38]; it is thus important to distinguish
between the measure exhibited by an actual orbit, and the measure of the orbit obtained
from computer simulations, which may differ due to accumulated computational round-off
errors. But if the absolutely continuous measure with respect to Lebesgue measure exists,
then computer simulations will yield the measure that we expect [16]. Thus, the theoretical
measure and the computational measure coincide in this work.
7. Related Work
The study of learning dynamics in game theory has a long history, dating back to the work
of Brown [17] and Robinson [70] on fictitious play in zero-sum games, which shortly followed
von Neumann’s seminal work on zero-sum games [86, 87]. A representative set of reference
books are the following: Cesa-Bianchi and Lugoisi [18], Fudenberg and Levine [36], Hofbauer
and Sigmund [41], Sandholm [76], Sergiu and Andreu [78], Young [90].
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Main precursors. Palaiopanos et al. [61] put forward the study of chaotic dynamics
arising from Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) learning in congestion games. They
established the existence of an attracting limit cycle of period two and of Li-Yorke chaos for
MWU dynamics in atomic congestion games with two agents and two links with linear cost
functions. Symmetry of the game (i.e., the existence of a symmetric equilibrium where both
agents select each path with probability 0.5) results in a limit cycle of period two. They also
showed for a specific instance of a game with an asymmetric equilibrium that MWU leads to
Li-Yorke chaos, provided that agents adapt the strategies with a sufficiently large learning
rate (step size)  (equivalently, if agents use a fixed learning rate  but their costs are scaled
up sufficiently large). Shortly afterwards, Chotibut et al. [20] established that Li-Yorke chaos
is prevalent in any two-agent atomic congestion games with two parallel links and linear cost
functions, provided the equilibrium is asymmetric. Namely, in any 2×2 congestion game with
an asymmetric equilibrium, Li-Yorke chaos emerges as the cost functions grow sufficiently
large, but only if the initial condition is symmetric, i.e., both agents start with the same
initial conditions. Furthermore, [20] established for the first time that, despite periodic or
chaotic behaviors, the time-average strategies of both agents always converge exactly to the
interior Nash equilibrium. While our current work leverages techniques from [20], it also
investigates other definitions of chaos, e.g., positive topological entropy, studies non-atomic
congestion games, and relates the results to the Price of Anarchy and system efficiency
analysis. Moreover, whereas in [20, 61] chaotic behavior is contained in a one-dimensional
invariant subspace of the two dimensional space, in this paper the dimensionality of the
system is already equal to one and hence the chaotic results are relevant for the whole
statespace. Lastly, in the appendices, we provide preliminary results for learning dynamics
in larger and more complex congestion games with many degrees of freedom.
Chaos in game theory. Under the assumption of perfect rationality, it is not surprising
that Nash equilibria are central concepts in game theory. However, in reality, players do
not typically play a game following a Nash equilibrium strategy. The seminal work of Sato
et al. [77] showed analytically by computing the Lyapunov exponents of the system that even
in a simple two-player game of rock-paper-scissor, replicator dynamics (the continuous-time
analogue of MWU) can lead to chaos, rendering the equilibrium strategy inaccessible. For
two-player games with a large number of available strategies (complicated games), Galla
and Farmer [37] argue that experienced weighted attraction (EWA) learning, a behavioral
economics model of learning dynamics, exhibits also chaotic behaviors in a large parameter
space. The prevalence of these chaotic dynamics also persists in games with many players, as
shown in the recent follow-up work [75]. Thus, careful examinations suggest a complex be-
havioral landscape in many games (small or large) for which no single theoretical framework
currently applies. Sparrow et al. [81] and van Strien and Sparrow [85] prove that fictitious
play learning dynamics for a class of 3x3 games, including the Shapley’s game and zero-sum
dynamics, possess rich periodic and chaotic behavior. Cheung and Piliouras [19] prove that
many online learning algorithms, including MWU, with a constant step size is Lyapunov
chaotic when applied to zero-sum games. Finally, Pangallo et al. [63] has established experi-
mentally that a variant of reinforcement learning, known as Experience-Weighted Attraction
(EWA), leads to limit cycles and high-dimensional chaos in two agent games with negatively
correlated payoffs. This is strongly suggestive that chaotic, non-equilibrium results can be
further generalized for other variants of zero-sum games.
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Other recent non-equilibrium phenomena in game theory. In recent years, the (al-
gorithmic) game theory community has produced several non-equilibrium results. Daskalakis
et al. [27] showed that MWU does not converge even in a time-average sense in a specific
3× 3 game. Kleinberg et al. [43] established non-convergent dynamics for replicator dynam-
ics in a 2 × 2 × 2 game and show as a result that the system social welfare converges to
states that dominate all Nash equilibria. Ostrovski and van Strien [60] analyzed continuous-
time fictitious play in a 3 × 3 game and showed similarly that the dynamics dominate in
performance Nash equilibria. Our results add a new chapter in this direction, providing
detailed understanding of the non-equilibrium phenomena arising from MWU in non-atomic
congestion games, as well as their important implications on regret and social costs.
In evolutionary game theory contexts, which typically study continuous-time variant of
MWU (replicator dynamics), numerous non-convergence results are known but again are
commonly restricted to small games [76]. Piliouras and Shamma [69] and Piliouras et al.
[67] showed that replicator dynamics in (network) zero-sum games exhibit a specific type
of repetitive behavior, known as Poincare´ recurrence. Recently, Mertikopoulos et al. [53]
proved that Poincare´ recurrence also shows up in a more general class of continuous-time
dynamics known as Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL). Mai et al. [52] established that
the recurrence results for replicator extend to dynamically evolving zero-sum games. Per-
fectly periodic (i.e., cyclic) behavior for replicator dynamics may arise in team competition
[68] as well as in network competition [57]. Works in this category combine arguments such
as volume preservation and the existence of constants of motions (“conservation of energy”)
to show cyclic or recurrent behaviors. Pangallo et al. [62] established empirically the emer-
gence of cycles and more generally non-equilibrium behavior in numerous learning dynamics
in games and showed correlations between their behavior and the behavior of much sim-
pler best-response dynamics. Some formal connections between limit behaviors of complex
learning dynamics and better response dynamics are developed in [64].
Game dynamics as physics. Recently, Bailey and Piliouras [8] established a robust
connection between game theory, online optimization and a ubiquitous class of systems
in classical physics known as Hamiltonian dynamics, which naturally exhibit conservation
laws. In the case of discrete-time dynamics, such as MWU or gradient descent, the system
trajectories are first order approximations of the continuous dynamics; conservation laws as
well as recurrence then no longer hold. Instead we get “energy” increase and divergence
to the boundary, as shown by Bailey and Piliouras [6], as well as volume expansion and
Lyapunov chaos in zero-sum games, as shown by Cheung and Piliouras [19]. Despite this
divergent, chaotic behavior, gradient descent with fixed step size, has vanishing regret in
zero-sum games [7]. So far, it is not clear to what extent the connections with Hamiltonian
dynamics can be generalized; however, Ostrovski and van Strien [59] have considered a class
of piecewise affine Hamiltonian vector fields whose orbits are piecewise straight lines and
developed the connections with best-reply dynamics. The connection between game theory
and physics can hopefully enable us to understand and possibly exploit the hidden structure
in non-equilibrium game dynamics, similarly to how in this paper we showed formally that
chaotic dynamics have their time-average converging to the value equal to the equilibrium.
Game dynamics as dynamical systems. Finally, Papadimitriou and Piliouras [64, 65]
put forward a program for linking game theory to topology of dynamical systems, specifically
to Conley’s fundamental theorem of dynamical systems [25]. This approach shifts attention
from Nash equilibria to a more general notion of recurrence, called chain recurrence. This
THE ROUTE TO CHAOS IN ROUTING GAMES 23
notion generalizes both periodicity and Poincare´ recurrence and as such can express the above
results in a single framework. Whether and to what extent this framework will become useful
depends on numerous factors, including the possibility of successfully incorporating it into
a computational, experimental framework (see [58] for a current approach). Note that our
paper also attempts to form a bridge to the dynamical systems literature, especially to the
richly developed theory of interval maps as well as to ergodic theory.
8. Discussion on fixed versus shrinking step sizes and regret
What about shrinking step sizes and vanishing regret? In this paper, we examine
MWU with a fixed step size  that has non-vanishing regret. Can our results be disregarded
if the agents leverage shrinking step sizes (that depend on the length of the game history),
e.g.  = 1/
√
T , which results in a vanishing regret of O(1/
√
T )? Is applying shrinking step
sizes a quick and painless fix? The answer is no. The reason lies inside the big O notation.
O(1/
√
T )-regret: What is inside the O? When agents implement MWU with shrinking
step-size (T ) = 1/
√
T and the cost in each time step is cn : A → R, with cn(s) ∈ [0,M ],
then its regret is
T∑
t=1
Ean∼xncn(an)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MWU with 1/
√
T step size
< min
a∈A
T∑
n=1
cn(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
best fixed action
+(M + 1)
√
T log(|A|)
where |A| is the number of strategies available to the agents (see also [18] [Sections 2.6,
2.8, Remark 2.2] for the discussion on why the term O(M
√
T log(|A|)) cannot be further
improved in general optimization settings). Hence, the time-average regret is
(M+1)
√
log(|A|)√
T
,
which vanishes as T → ∞. However, for large enough M the amount of time T for the re-
gret to become negligibly small can be impractically large. In the case of games, due to the
stability of the online payoff streams one can prove stronger regret bounds [33, 83] includ-
ing Θ(1/T ) [53] for all (continuous-time) Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) dynamics,
which encompasses MWU. However, these bounds imply that in order to reach a state of
small regret , we still require a number of steps that is polynomial in M/, where M is the
largest possible cost value in our game.
What is the value of M in our setting of congestion games? It is the worst possible cost
M = N max{α, β}. So, for a large population size N , even for MWU with shrinking , the
wait until the regret is negligibly small can be impractically long. For any meaningful time
horizon, the regret of the agents can still be so large that the (λ, µ)-robustness type of results
[72] cannot be applied. A new theoretical framework to study these long transient periods
with large regrets is needed.
The cost normalization “trick” only masks the problem of slow convergence.
In any game, including congestion games with many agents, one can normalize the costs so
that they lie in [0, 1] instead of [0,M ] and indeed this is the standard practice in the Price of
Anarchy literature when analyzing no-regret dynamics. In this case, the regret term appears
more innocuous:
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T∑
t=1
Ean∼xncn(an)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MWU with 1/
√
T step size
< min
a∈A
T∑
n=1
cn(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
best fixed action
+ 2
√
T log(|A|)︸ ︷︷ ︸
regret in the unit of worst possible cost
Of course, this does not fix the problem as the regret term only looks smaller but in fact
it is expressed in really large units. This cost normalization suggests that if e.g. in NYC all
drivers use the same road, then the cost experienced by them is equal to 1. Naturally this
nightmarish scenario, if it could ever be enforced, would translate into a monstrous traffic
jam that would require hundreds or thousands of hours to resolve. So, the real regret in this
setting is 2
√
T log(|A|)×(the duration of the worst traffic jam possible in a city of millions of
people). This is an enormous number and can only be amortized by running the system for
e.g. hundreds of years in the case of NYC. The usage of measuring units that scale up with
the problem that is being measured (like a measuring tape that keeps adjusting the notion of
a meter) creates quite a bit of confusion about how efficient are the states reachable within
a reasonable time horizon. In this work, we show that the effective scaling up of the cost
functions due to the increase in total demand/population can lead to a qualitatively different
behavior (chaos instead of equilibration) hence these effects cannot be safely discounted by
normalizing costs but instead need to be carefully studied.
The slow convergence of no-regret algorithms to correlated equilibria is well
supported by theoretical work in the area. No-regret algorithms are rather inefficient
in finding coarse correlated equilibria in large games, exactly because their regrets vanish at
a slow rate. This is why different centralized ellipsoid methods algorithms have been devel-
oped to compute correlated equilibria in games with many agents that necessitate compact
descriptions [42, 66]. Quoting from [66],
“(No-regret) learning methods require an exponential number of iterations to
converge, proportional to (1/)k for a constant k > 1. Our ellipsoid-based
algorithm, on the other hand is polynomial in log(1

).” . . . “Intractability of
an equilibrium concept would make it implausible as a model of behavior. In
the words of Kamal Jain: “If your PC cannot find it, then neither can the
market.””
Our analysis explains the algorithmic behavior along this long transient (metastable)
epoch, showing that the behavior can be rather different and much more inefficient than
the standard asymptotic equilibrium analysis suggests. Of course, this paper focuses on
small networks (two parallel edges) and linear cost functions, but these gaps will only be
amplified when we consider larger networks and more general (e.g. polynomial) cost func-
tions. In fact, computational experiments on real-life congestion games such as in wireless
networks are in perfect agreement with our theoretical analysis of slow/non-stabilization and
bad performance of MWU and variants, which we now discuss.
MWU and its variants fail to converge efficiently in real-world applications
of congestion settings. Appavoo et al. [3] studies, via simulations, resource selection
problems for mobile networks, which are formulated as congestion games. They study the
performance of MWU and EXP3, a well known multi-armed bandit variant of MWU, and
show that even in relatively small instances (20 devices/agents and 3 networks/resources),
these algorithms fail to equilibrate, and in fact perform worse than naive greedy solutions.
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[4] iterates more clearly on these failures, identifying the slow rate of stabilization as the
main culprit behind the poor performance.
“. . . we consider the problem of wireless network selection. Mobile devices are
often required to choose the right network to associate with for optimal per-
formance, which is non-trivial. The excellent theoretical properties of EXP3,
a leading multi-armed bandit algorithm, suggest that it should work well for
this type of problem. Yet, it performs poorly in practice. A major limitation
is its slow rate of stabilization.”
Is a step-size of 2−100 realistic as a model of human behavior? A continuously
shrinking learning step size is a rather artificial model of human learning behavior; a suffi-
ciently small step size means learning almost does not happen. More plausibly, to exclude
the situation with unrealistic no-learning behavior, a lower bound on the learning rate 
should be imposed. It is this exact parameter that we shall adopt as the fixed learning rate
of our MWU model. The fact that we are using a fixed (but arbitrarily small) instead of
continuously shrinking step size with a limit value of zero, is a feature of our model that
does not artificially curtail agent adaptivity merely to enable theoretical results that only
become binding after unreasonably long time horizons.
Shrinking step-sizes versus increasing populations. Last but not least, we now
show how the analysis for a fixed learning rate  can easily be extended to capture non-
equilibrating phenomena for arbitrary sequences of shrinking step sizes, as long as we allow
for a dynamically evolving, increasing population. It should be already clear that the step-
size  and the population size N (or equivalently the value of the maximum cost M) are
competing forces that control system’s stability. The larger population size implies the
larger maximum cost M , which in turn implies the larger time horizon for MWU with
a shrinking step-size algorithm to acquire smaller time-average regret, and for the classic
equilibrium, Price of Anarchy, analysis to restore its predictive power. Unfortunately, if the
population increases at a sufficiently fast rate to counter the shrinking step-size rate, the
time-average regret will never vanish. Specifically, from our analysis, we proved that the
relevant parameter that controls the long-time dynamics (e.g. equilibration, limit cycles, or
chaos) and the social cost is a = (α + β)N ln
(
1
1−
)
, see Section 4. As long as at every time
step n, a(n) = (α+β)N(n) ln
(
1
1−(n)
)
is greater than the chaotic threshold then the system
will always remain in the chaotic regime despite the step-size going to zero. For example, for
(n) = 1/
√
n, it suffices that N ≥ ab
(α+β) ln
(
1
1−1/√n
) where ab is the chaotic threshold defined
in Theorem 3.8. Simple calculations show that it suffices N ≥ ab
(α+β)
√
n ≥ ab
(α+β) ln
(
1
1−1/√n
) ,
Namely, a slowly (sublinearly) increasing population suffices for the system to remain forever
in its non-equilibrating, inefficient, chaotic regime.
9. Conclusion
We explore the Multiplicative Weight Update algorithm in two-strategy non-atomic con-
gestion games. We find that standard game-theoretic equilibrium analysis, such as the Price
of Anarchy, fails to capture extremely rich non-equilibrium phenomena of our simple model.
Even when the Price of Anarchy is equal to 1, the system can be dynamically unstable when
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the total demand N increases. Every system has a carrying capacity, above which the dy-
namics become non-equilibrating. In fact, they become chaotic when N is sufficiently large,
provided the equilibrium flow is asymmetric.
This demand-driven instability is a universal phenomenon that holds for arbitrary linear
cost functions. The dynamics we study here also exhibit a remarkable time-average property;
namely, in any non-equilibrating regime driven by large total demand, the time-average flows
of the paths converge exactly to the Nash equilibrium value, a property reminiscent of the
behavior of regret minimizing dynamics in zero-sum games. Interestingly, when we keep
increasing the total system demand, congestion games eventually “break down” and flip
their characteristics to become more like zero-sum games. On the other hand, the time-
average convergence property does not guarantee small regret nor low social costs, even
when the Price of Anarchy is equal to 1. In fact, time-average regret and time-average social
costs increase with fluctuations from the equilibrium value, which can be maximally large
in the non-equilibrating regime. In the case of a symmetric equilibrium flow, fluctuations
arise from an extreme swing; almost all users will take the same route and simultaneously
alternate between the two routes, when the population size is large. The time-average social
cost in this situation can thus be as high as it can get.
Our benign-looking learning in games model is full of surprises and puzzles. The dynam-
ical system approach provides a useful framework to investigate the unusual connections
between non-equilibrating dynamics, and the classic game-theoretic (equilibrium) metrics
such as regret, and Price of Anarchy. For instance, we show in the Appendix that, in certain
non-equilibrating regimes, the system may have multiple distinct attractors and hence the
time-average regret and social cost depend critically on initial conditions. Also in the Ap-
pendix, we report other interesting observations, discuss future directions and even include
extensions to settings with heterogeneous users and games with multiple strategies. Notable
properties of periodic orbits, such as the coexistence of two attracting periodic orbits, and
the Feigenbaum’s period-doubling bifurcation route to chaos are also presented.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Properties of attracting orbits
In this section, we investigate the properties of the attracting periodic orbits associated
with the interval map fa,b : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
(21) fa,b(x) =
x
x+ (1− x) exp (a(x− b)) .
We’ve argued in the main text that, when b = 0.5, the dynamics will converge toward the
fixed point b = 0.5 whenever a < 8. And for any a ≥ 8, the long-time dynamics will converge
toward the attracting periodic orbits of period 2 located at {σa, 1 − σa}. The bifurcation
diagram is thus symmetric around b = 0.5 as shown in the top picture of Fig. 5. In this
case, the time-average regret is well-approximated by its upper bound, and the normalized
time-average social cost asymptotes to the maximum value of 2.
When b differs from 0.5, we have argued in the main text that the emergence of chaos is
inevitable, provided a is sufficiently large. The period-doubling bifurcations route to chaos
is guaranteed to arise. Fig. 2 of the main text shows chaotic bifurcation diagrams when
b = 0.7. In this asymmetric case, standard equilibrium analysis only applies when the fixed
point b is stable, which is when |f ′a,b(b)| ≤ 1, or equivalently when a ≤ 2/b(1− b).
Feigenbaum’s universal route to chaos: The period diagrams as a function of the two
free-parameters a and b are shown in Fig. 6. It’s interesting to report numerical observations
of Feigenbaum’s route to chaos for our bimodal map fa,b. Although Feigenbaum’s univer-
sality is known to apply among a one-dimensional unimodal interval map with a quadratic
maximum [30, 48, 84], we also observe the Feigenbaum’s period-doubling route to chaos for
our bimodal interval map. Specifically, by fixing a and varying b, we numerically measure
the ratios
(22) δn ≡ bn+1 − bn
bn+2 − bn+1 , αn ≡
dn
dn+1
,
where bn denotes the value at which a period 2
n-orbits appears, and dn = f
2n−1
a,b (xl)−xl such
that the left critical point xl =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− 4
a
)
(the point at which fa,b attains its maximum)
belongs to the 2n-orbits7. As n grows large (we truncate our observation at n = 12), we find
(23) δn=12 ≈ 4.669 . . . , αn=12 ≈ −2.502 . . . ,
which agree, to 4 digits, with the Feigenbaum’s universal constants, δ = 4.669201609102990 . . .
and α = −2.502907875 . . . , that appear, for example, in the period-doubling route to chaos
in the logistic map.
Coexistence of two attracting periodic orbits and non-uniqueness of regret and
social cost: The map fa,b has a negative Schwartzian derivative when a > 4, thus it has at
most two attracting or neutral periodic orbits. Although the time-average of every periodic
orbits converges exactly to the Nash equilibrium b, the variance limT→∞ 1T
∑T
n=1(xn − b)2
of the coexisting periodic orbits can differ. Thus, the normalized time-average social cost
and the time-average regret, which depend on the variance, can be multi-valued. Which
value is attained depends on the variance of the attracting periodic orbits that the dynamics
asymptotically reaches, which itself depends on the initial condition x0. Period diagrams of
7In this way, we can numerically approximate the signed second Feigenbaum constant α [82].
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Figure 5. Even in the symmetric case of b = 0.5, bifurcation diagram (Top) demonstrates
instability of the routing game driven by the increase in total demand N. Here,  = 1−1/e so
a = N as usual. In this symmetric case, the capacity of the network, under which long-time
dynamics equilibrate, is N∗b = 8. Above the capacity, attracting periodic orbits of period
2 emerges. (Middle) The time-average regret, shown in the purple circle symbol, suddenly
becomes strictly positive at the bifurcation. The regret bound also well approximates the
actual values. (Bottom) normalized time-average social cost also suddenly becomes greater
than 1 at the bifurcation. Even in the symmetric case, the classic Price of Anarchy metric
fails for N > N∗b = 8.
Fig. 7 reveal how the two coexisting initial condition-dependent attracting periodic orbits
are intertwined, and Fig. 8 reports the evidence of two coexisting periodic orbits whose
variances differ, leading to multi-valued time-average regret and social cost.
Stability of the orbits: In addition to the period diagrams, we investigate the stability
of the attracting orbits by considering the Lyapunov exponents 〈log |f ′a,b|〉, where 〈·〉 denotes
time-average. Fig. 9 (bottom) shows the Lyapunov exponents associated with different
attracting orbits, revealing that extended-leg structures arise from the situations when the
orbits become superstable, that is when one of the two critical points is an element of the
orbits8. Within the regime of the same period (same color), there are situations when the
8Recall that the orbit is superstable if one of the critical points is an element of the orbits, so that
f ′a,b(xc) = 0. This means the Lyapunov exponents in principle is −∞, visualized as a white bright color.
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Figure 6. Period diagrams of the small-period attracting periodic orbits associated with
the map (21). The colors encode the periods of attracting periodic orbits as follows: period
1 (fixed point) = yellow, period 2 = red, period 3 = blue, period 4 = green, period 5 =
brown, period 6 = cyan, period 7 = darkgray, period 8 = magenta, and period larger than
8 = white. The equilibrium analysis is only viable when the fixed point b is stable, i.e.
when a ≤ 2/b(1 − b). In other region of the phase-space, non-equilibrating dynamics arise
and system proceeds through the period-doubling bifurcation route to chaos in the white
region. The picture is generated from the following algorithm: 20000 preliminary iterations
are discarded. Then a point is considered periodic of period n if |fn(x)− x| < 0.0000000001
and it is not periodic of any period smaller than n. Slight asymmetry is caused by the fact
that the starting point is the left critical point xl = 1/2 −
√
1/4− 1/a. In addition, for a
fixed a, as we vary b and penetrate into the chaotic regimes (white) from the outer layers,
we numerically observe Feigenbaum’s universal route to chaos as discussed below.
two superstable extended-leg curves intersect. These scenarios happen when both critical
points are elements of periodic orbits.
Also, note Fig. 6 reveals that the qualitatively similar extended-leg structures in the period
diagrams appear in layers, with a chaotic regime sandwiched between two layers. Notice also
that the consecutive layers have periods differ by 1. To understand why these layers with
increasing periods appear, we investigate superstable periodic orbits in these layers and found
that, all elements of the orbits, except for the left critical points xl = 1/2−
√
1/4− 1/a and
its image fa,b(xl), are approximately 0, independent of the period of the orbits. With this
observation, we now approximate one of the superstable regions within each layer, using the
time-average convergence to the Nash equilibrium property of Corollary 3.4. Namely, let xl
be an element of a periodic orbit of period p such that only xl and fa,b(xl) are significantly
larger than 0, then from Corollary 3.4 we have
(24) xl + fa,b(xl) +
{
f 2a,b(xl) + · · ·+ fp−1a,b (xl)
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈ 0
= pb.
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Figure 7. Coexistence of two initial condition-dependent attracting periodic orbits. The
pictures are generated from the same procedure as explained in Fig.6, except that here the
initial conditions for the top and the bottom pictures are located at the left and the right
critical points, respectively. Also, b ∈ [43/80, 51/80] and a ∈ [4, 54]. The color schemes are
the same as those of Fig. 6 : period 1 (fixed point) = yellow, period 2 = red, period 3 =
blue, period 4 = green, period 5 = brown, period 6 = cyan, period 7 = darkgray, period 8
= magenta, and period larger than 8 = white.
Numerical results show that the approximation that every elements of the periodic orbits
except xl and fa,b(xl) are close to 0 becomes better and better for periodic orbits with larger
periods; hence, we’re interested in the limit of a  1. To leading order in 1
a
, xl ≈ 1a and
fa,b(xl) ≈ 11+ae1−ab so that (24) gives 1a + 11+ae(1−ab) ≈ pb. Defining
(25) S(a, b) =
1
ab
+
1
b+ (ab)e(1−ab)
,
we obtain the condition
(26) S(a, b) ≈ p,
that should become more accurate as a 1, for xl to be on the periodic orbit of period p with
the aforementioned property. Fig. 10 reveals that the level sets of S(a, b) for p = 2, 3, . . . , 10
accurately tracks the extended-leg structures with increasing periods, showing that these
superstable orbits are the skeletons of the extended-leg layers shown in Fig. 6.
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Figure 8. Coexistence of two attracting periodic orbits at b = 0.61 with two different
variances implies non-uniqueness of time-average regret and normalized time-average social
cost. As usual, we set  = 1 − 1/e so that N = a. (Top) The range of N in the shaded
green region show coexistence of two attracting periodic orbits. The blue (red) periodic
orbits is selected if the initial condition is the left (right) critical point xl (xr). There are
at most 2 coexisting attracting periodic orbits, as guaranteed by the negative Schwartzian
derivative for our bimodal map fa,b. The variance of the two periodic orbits are clearly
different; thus, the time-average regret (middle) and the normalized time-average social cost
(bottom) which depend on the variance are multi-valued. Which values are attained depend
on initial conditions.
In addition, we can approximate the condition when both critical points xl and xr become
the elements of these superstable periodic orbits. In these specific permutations of the orbits,
we require xr = fa,b(xl). And from (24) we obtain xl + fa,b(xl) ≈ pb. Since xl + xr = 1,
we conclude that both critical points will be on the periodic orbit of period p with the
aforementioned property when
(27) b ≈ 1
p
, and
1
a
[2 ln(a− 1) + 1] ≈ 1
p
,
where the condition on a follows from (26) and b ≈ 1
p
. Therefore, if we plot the relationship
b = 1
a
[2 ln(a− 1) + 1], the graph will encompass the situations when both critical points are
on the periodic orbits with the aforementioend property. This is illustrated by the dashed
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Figure 9. (Bottom) Lyapunov exponents 〈log |f ′a,b|〉 numerically approximated by
1
T
∑T
n=1 log |f ′a,b(xn)| with T = 2000, shown in gray scale, superposed on the period dia-
grams (Top) adopted from Fig. 7 (Top). The color scheme of the Lyapunov exponents is
such that 〈log |f ′a,b|〉 < −1.5 is shown in white (very stable orbits) and 〈log |f ′a,b|〉 > 0 is
shown in black (unstable or chaotic). One can clearly see that the extended-leg structures
arise from having superstable orbits as the skeleton of each attracting periodic orbits regime.
When both critical points are elements of the attracting orbit, the two extended legs inter-
sect. As expected, close to the bifurcation boundaries and in the chaotic regime, the orbits
becomes unstable, as represented by the black color.
olive green line of Fig. 10 that passes through the intersections between two superstable
curves within each period-p region.
Appendix B. Extensions to more complex congestion games
B.1. Games with more than two strategies. We will consider a m-strategy congestion
game with a continuum of players/agents, where all of them use multiplicative weights update.
Each of the players controls an infinitesimally small fraction of the flow. We will assume that
the total flow of all the agents is equal to N . We will denote the fraction of the players using
i one of the m strategies at time n as xi(n) where i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Intuitively, this model
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Figure 10. Layers of extended-leg structures with increasing periods arise from specific
permutations of superstable periodic orbits. As argued in the stability of the orbits section,
S(a, b) = p defines the superstable periodic orbits of period p with the property that only xl
and f(xl) are the only two elements of the periodic orbits that are not near 0. The level sets
of S(a, b) at p = 2, 3, . . . , 10 are displayed in different colors (bottom), which accurately track
extended-leg curves with large negative Lyapunov exponents (top). The color scheme of the
Lyapunov exponents is such that 〈log |f ′a,b|〉 < −1.5 is shown in white (very stable orbits)
and 〈log |f ′a,b|〉 > 0 is shown in black (unstable or chaotic). The dashed olive green curve
b = 1
a
[2 ln(a− 1) + 1] obtained from (27) encompasses the situations when both critical
points are the only two non-near-zero elements of the periodic orbits, i.e. when the two
superstable curves in each region of the same period p intersect. These results provide a
reasonable answer to why layers of extended-leg structures with increasing periods appear
in the period diagram of Fig. 6.
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captures how a large population of players chooses between multiple alternative, parallel
paths for going from point A to point B. If a large fraction of the players choose the same
strategy, this leads to congestion/traffic, and the cost increases. We will assume that the
cost is proportional to the load. If we denote by c(i) the cost of any player playing strategy
number i, and the coefficients of proportionality are αi, then we get
(28) c(i) = αiNxi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
At time n + 1 the players know already the cost of the strategies at time n and update
their choices. Since we have a continuum of agents we will assume that the fractions of users
using the first, second, m-th path are respectively equal to the probabilities x1(n), . . . , xm(n).
Once again we will update the probabilities using MWU. The update rule in the case of m
strategies is as follows:
(29) xi(n+ 1) = xi(n)
(1− )c(i)∑
j∈{1,...,m} xj(n)(1− )c(j)
,
Theorem B.1. Given any non-atomic congestion game with m actions as described by model
(28),(29), there exists a total system demand N0 such that for if N ≥ N0 in each time period
n, there exists at least one pair of strategies i, j such that the relative flow in that pair of
strategies
(
i.e, xi/(xi+xj), xj/(xi+xj)
)
follows exactly the MWU dynamics of a two strategy
non-atomic congestion game in its non-equilibrating regime.
Proof. The critical observation is that we can compare the relative probabilities/loads of two
strategies/paths. Specifically let i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Define variable yi,j def= xixi+xj . Then by
substituting in equation (29) we have that:
yi,j(n+ 1) =
xi(n+ 1)
xi(n+ 1) + xj(n+ 1)
=
xi(n)(1− )c(i)
xi(n)(1− )c(i) + xj(n)(1− )c(j)
=
xi(n)(1− )αiNxi(n)
xi(n)(1− )αiNxi(n) + xj(n)(1− )αjNxj(n)
=
yi,j(n)(1− )αiNxi(n)
yi,j(n)(1− )αiNxi(n) + (1− yi,j(n))(1− )αjNxj(n)
=
yi,j(n)(1− )αiN(xi(n)+xj(n))yi,j(n)
yi,j(n)(1− )αiN(xi(n)+xj(n))yi,j(n) + (1− yi,j(n))(1− )αjN(xi(n)+xj(n))(1−yi,j(n))
If we define a time-dependent (n) such that 1− (n) = (1− )(xi(n)+xj(n)) then the above
equation results in:
yi,j(n+ 1) =
yi,j(n)(1− (n))αiNyi,j(n)
yi,j(n)(1− (n))αiNyi,j(n) + (1− yi,j(n))(1− (n))αjN(1−yi,j(n))
That is, the dynamics of the ratio of probabilities/loads when comparing strategies i, j are
identical to that of a game with two strategies but where the learning rate  changes over
time and where (n) = 1 − (1 − )xi(n)+xj(n). The yi,j dynamics on any pair of edges (i, j)
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exactly follow the dynamics of the two strategy game with cost functions aiN(n)x, ajN(n)x
where the effective demand is N(n) = N(xi + xj).
We know that given any pair of edges with constants ai, aj there exists a lower bound for
N(ai, aj) after which the system bifurcates and is no longer convergent (Theorems 3.6, 3.8
and Corollary 3.9). If N0 =
(
m
2
)
maxi 6=j N(ai, aj), this trivially suffices to imply that on each
time period n, there exists at least one pair of strategies i, j (e.g. the most heavily congested
pair) such that the relative flow in that pair exceeds its effective capacity N(ai, aj), and is
thus in its non-equilibrating regime. 
B.2. Games with heterogeneous users. This is the model for the case of heterogeneous
population. We will start with the simplest possible case where there are only two subpop-
ulations. We will consider a two-strategy congestion game with two continuums of play-
ers/agents, where all of them use multiplicative weights update. Each of the players controls
an infinitesimal small fraction of the flow. Out of the total flow/demand N of the first pop-
ulation has size Nη1 whereas the total flow of the second population is Nη2. A canonical
example would be η1 = η2 = 0.5.
We will denote the fraction of the players of the first (resp. second) population using the
first strategy at time n as xn (resp. yn). The second strategy is chosen by 1 − xn (resp.
1− yn) fraction of the players. Intuitively, this model captures how two large population of
players/cars (e.g. taxis versus normal cars) chooses between two alternative, parallel paths
for going from point A to point B. If a large fraction of the players choose the same strategy,
this leads to congestion/traffic, and the cost increases. We will assume that the cost is
proportional to the load. If we denote by c(j) the cost of the player playing the strategy
number j, and the coefficients of proportionality are α, β, then we get
(30) c(1) = αN(η1x+ η2y), c(2) = βN(η1 + η2 − η1x− η2y)
For multiplicative weights update (MWU), for the first (resp. second), there is a parameter
1 ∈ (0, 1), (resp. 2 ∈ (0, 1)) which can be treated as the common learning rate of all players
of that population. Thus, we get
(31)
xn+1 =
xn(1− 1)c(1)
xn(1− 1)c(1) + (1− xn)(1− 1)c(2) ,
yn+1 =
yn(1− 2)c(1)
yn(1− 2)c(1) + (1− yn)(1− 2)c(2) .
By combining equations (30) and (31),
(32)
xn+1 =
xn
xn + (1− xn)(1− 1)N(β(η1+η2)−(α+β)(η1xn+η2yn)) ,
yn+1 =
yn
yn + (1− yn)(1− 2)N(β(η1+η2)−(α+β)(η1xn+η2yn)) .
After a similar change of variables as in the homogeneous case formula (32) becomes
(33)
xn+1 =
xn
xn + (1− xn) exp(a1(η1xn + η2yn − b)) ,
yn+1 =
yn
yn + (1− yn) exp(a2(η1xn + η2yn − b)) .
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In the simplest case of the equal shares/mixtures (i.e. η1 = η2 = 0.5) we have:
(34)
xn+1 =
xn
xn + (1− xn) exp(a1(0.5(xn + yn)− b)) ,
yn+1 =
yn
yn + (1− yn) exp(a2(0.5(xn + yn)− b)) .
Dimensional reduction: Although the heterogeneous model contains more independent
variables than the homogeneous case, the dynamics are constrained in a lower-dimensional
manifold. That is, we will show that the function I(x, y) = (1−x)
a2ya1
(1−y)a1xa2 is an invariant function
for population mixtures. This means that the curves I(x, y) = c are invariant for any time
step n, where c parametrizes the family of invariant curves.
Lemma B.2. The function I(x, y) = (1−x)
a2ya1
(1−y)a1xa2 is an invariant function (first integral) of
the dynamics.
Proof. It is easy to check that the set of equations (33) is equivalent to
(35)
xn+1
1− xn+1 =
xn
(1− xn) exp(a1(η1xn + η2yn − b)) ,
yn+1
1− yn+1 =
yn
(1− yn) exp(a2(η1xn + η2yn − b)) .
By raising the first equation to power a2 and the second equation to power a1 and dividing
them we derive that:
xa2n+1(1− yn+1)a1
(1− xn+1)a2ya1n+1
=
xa2n (1− yn)a1
(1− xn)a2ya1n
That is the function I(x, y) = (1−x)
a2ya1
(1−y)a1xa2 is an invariant function (first integral) of the
dynamics. 
Time-average convergence of the mixture to Nash equilibrium b. For the consid-
ered heterogeneous model we can show a result similar to Theorem 3.3 for the homogeneous
population, that is that b is Cesa`ro attracting mixture of trajectories.
Theorem B.3. For every a1, a2 > 0, b ∈ (0, 1) and (x0, y0) ∈ (0, 1)2 we have
(36) lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
n=0
(η1xn + η2yn) = b.
Proof. Let f(xn, yn) = (xn+1, yn+1) be defined by (33) where η1, η2 ∈ (0, 1) and η1 + η2 = 1.
The map t 7→ t
1−t is a homeomorphism of (0, 1) onto (0,∞), and its inverse is given by
t 7→ t
1+t
. Thus, we can introduce new variables, z = x
1−x and w =
y
1−y . In these variables
our map will be g : (0,∞)2 → (0,∞)2, and if g(zn, wn) = (zn+1, wn+1), then
(37)
zn+1 = zn exp
(
−a1
(
η1
zn
1 + zn
+ η2
wn
1 + wn
− b
))
,
wn+1 = wn exp
(
−a2
(
η1
zn
1 + zn
+ η2
wn
1 + wn
− b
))
.
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If wn = cz
a2/a1
n then wn+1 = cz
a2/a1
n+1 . This shows that if zn is close to 0 then also wn is
close to 0, and by (37) we get zn+1 > zn. Similarly, if zn is close to infinity, then also wn is
close to infinity, and by (37) we get zn+1 < zn. Together with another inequality obtained
from (37),
zn exp(−a1(1− b)) < zn+1 < zn exp(a1b),
this proves that if z0, w0 ∈ (0,∞) then infn≥0 zn > 0 and supn≥0 zn <∞.
The first equation of (37) can be rewritten as
zn+1 = zn exp(a1(η1xn + η2yn − b)),
so by induction we get
zT = z0 exp
(
a1
(
T−1∑
n=0
(η1xn + η2yn)− Tb
))
.
Therefore there exists a real constant M (depending on the parameters and the initial point
(x0, y0)), such that ∣∣∣∣∣
T−1∑
n=0
(η1xn + η2yn)− Tb
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤M
for every T . Dividing by T and passing to the limit, we get
(38) lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
n=0
(η1xn + η2yn) = b.

We end here with numerical results to demonstrate that, perhaps not surprisingly, this
class of games not only possesses complex non-equilibrium behavior, but also allows for
an immediate generalization to a more realistic, larger dimensional system, in which new
and even more complex non-equilibrium phenomena can arise. Developing a more complete
theoretical understanding of these issues, will likely require the introduction of new tools
and techniques.
Figures (11) and (12) show attracting orbits generated from the map (34) (with η1 =
η2 = 0.5) for fixed values of a1, a2, b. There, 5000 random starting points are initialized. To
approximate where the attractors lie, the first 1000 iterates were made without plotting; the
next 200 were visualized.
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Figure 11. Attractor for the map (34) in the two-subpopulation model with a1 = 20, a2 =
30, b = 0.8. The white dots are the coordinates (x, y) generated from initializing 5000
(x0, y0)’s at random from the unit square domain, iterating them with (34) 1000 times, then
visualizing the next 200 iterates.
Figure 12. Attractor for the map (34) in the two-subpopulation model with a1 = 10, a2 =
30, b = 0.7. The white dots are the coordinates (x, y) generated from initializing 5000
(x0, y0)’s at random from the unit square domain, iterating them with (34) 1000 times, then
visualizing the next 200 iterates.
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